TUM EGO PAPE INQUAM UT MAGNA. — Prosa
2
Thanne seide I thus: "Owh! I wondre me that thow byhetist
me so grete thinges. Ne I ne doute nat that thou ne maist wel
parforme that thow behetist; but I preie the oonly this, that
thow ne tarie nat to telle me thilke thinges that thou hast
moevid."
"First," quod sche, "thow most nedes knowen that
good folk ben alwey strong and myghti, and the schrewes ben feble
and desert and naked of alle strengthes. And of thise thinges,
certes, everiche of hem is declared and schewed by other. For so
as good and yvel ben two contraries, yif so be that good be
stedfast, thanne scheweth the feblesse of yvel al opynly; and yif
thow knowe clerly the freelnesse of yvel, the stedfastnesse of
good is knowen. But for as moche as the fey of my sentence schal
ben the more ferme and haboundant, I wil gon by the to weye and
by the tothir, and I wil conferme the thinges that ben purposed,
now on this side and now on that side.
"Two thinges ther ben in whiche the effect of alle the
dedes of mankynde standeth (that is to seyn, wil and power); and
yif that oon of thise two faileth, ther nys nothing that may be
doon. For yif that wille lakketh, ther nys no wyght that
undirtaketh to done that he wol nat doon; and yif power faileth,
the wil nys but in idel and stant for naught. And therof cometh
it that yif thou see a wyght that wolde geten that he mai not
geten, thow maist nat douten that power ne faileth hym to have
that he wolde."
"This is open and cler," quod I, "ne it ne mai
nat
be denyed in no manere."
"And yif thou se a wyght," quod sche, "that hath
doon that he wolde doon, thow nilt nat douten that he ne hath had
power to doon it?"
"No," quod I.
"And in that that every wyght may, in that men
may holden hym myghti. (As who seith, in
so moche
as a man is myghty to doon a thing, in so mochel men halt hym
myghti.) And in that that he ne mai, in that men demen hym
to ben feble."
"I confesse it wel," quod I.
"Remembreth the," quod sche, "that I have
gaderid
and ischewid by forseide resouns that al the entencioun of the
wil of mankynde, whiche that is lad by diverse studies, hasteth
to comen to blisfulnesse."
"It remembreth me wel," quod I, "that it hath
ben
schewed."
"And recordeth the nat thanne," quod sche, "that
blisfulnesse is thilke same good that men requiren, so that
whanne that blisfulnesse is required of alle, that good also is
required and
desired of alle?"
"It ne recordeth me noght," quod I, "for I have
it gretly alwey ficched in my memorie."
"Alle folk thanne," quod sche, "goode and eek
badde, enforcen hem withoute difference of entencioun to comen
to good."
"This is a verray consequence," quod I.
"And certein is," quod sche, "that by the
getynge
of good ben men ymakid gode."
"This is certein," quod I.
"Thanne geten gode men that thei desiren?"
"So semeth it," quod I.
"But wikkide folk," quod sche, "yif thei geten
the
good that thei desiren, thei ne mowe nat ben wikkid."
"So is it," quod I.
"Than so as the ton and the tothir," quod sche,
"desiren good, and the gode folk geten good and not the
wikkide folk, than is it no doute that the gode folk ne ben
myghty and wikkid folk ben feble."
"Whoso that evere," quod I, "douteth of this, he
ne mai nat considere the nature of thinges ne the consequence of
resouns."
"And over this," quod sche, "if that ther ben
two
thinges that han o same purpos by kynde, and that oon of hem
pursuweth and performeth thilke same thing by naturel office, and
the tother mai nat doon thilke naturel office, but folweth, by
other manere than is covenable to nature, hym that acomplisseth
his purpos kyndely, and yit he ne acomplisseth nat his owene
purpos — whethir of thise two demestow for more myghti?"
"Yif that I conjecte," quod I, "that thou wilt
seie, algates yit I desire to herkne it more pleynly of the."
"Thou nilt nat thanne denye," quod sche, "that
the
moevement of goynge nys in men by kynde?"
"No,forsothe," quod I.
"Ne thou ne doutest nat," quod sche, "that
thilke
naturel office of goinge ne he the office of feet?"
"I ne doute it nat," quod I.
"Thanne," quod sche, "yif that a wight be myghti
to moeve, and goth uppon hise feet, and another, to whom thilke
naturel office of feet lakketh, enforceth hym to gone crepinge
uppon his handes, whiche of thise two oughte to ben holden the
more myghty by right?"
"Knyt forth the remenaunt," quod I, "for no
wight
ne douteth that he that mai gon by naturel office of feet ne be
more myghti than he that ne may nat."
"But the soverein good," quod sche, "that is
eveneliche purposed to the good folk and to badde, the gode folk
seken it by naturel office of vertus, and the schrewes enforcen
hem to getin it by diverse coveytise of erthly thinges, whiche
that nys noon naturel office to gete thilke same soverein good.
Trowestow that it be any other wise?"
"Nai," quod I, "for the consequence is opene and
schewynge of thinges that I have graunted, that nedes good folk
moten be myghty, and schrewes feble and unmyghti."
"Thou rennist aryght byforn me," quod sche, "and
this is the jugement (that is to sein, I
juge of
the), ryght as thise leches hen wont to hopin of sike folk,
whan thei aperceyven that nature is redressed and withstondeth
to the maladye. But for I se the now al redy to the
undirstondynge, I schal schewe the more
thikke and contynuel resouns. For loke now, how greetly scheweth
the feblesse and infirmite of wikkid folk, that ne mowen nat
comen to that hir naturel entencioun ledeth hem; and yit
almest thilke naturel entencioun constreyneth hem. And what were
to demen thanne of
schrewes, yif thilk naturel help
hadde forleten hem, the whiche naturel help of entencioun goth
alwey byforn hem and is so gret that unnethe it mai ben overcome?
Considere thanne how gret defaute of power and how gret feblesse
ther is in wikkide felonous folke. (As
who seith,
the grettere thing that is coveyted and the desir nat
acomplissed, of the lasse myght is he that coveyteth it and mai
nat acomplisse; and forthi Philosophie seith thus be sovereyn
good.) Ne schrewes ne requeren not lighte meedes ne veyne
games, whiche thei ne mai nat folwen ne holden; but thei failen
of thilke somme and of the heighte of thinges (that
is to seyn, soverein good). Ne these wrecches ne comen nat
to the effect of sovereyn good, the whiche thei enforcen hem
oonly to geten by nyghtes and by dayes. In the getyng of whiche
good the strengthe of good folk is ful wel yseene. For ryght so
as thou myghtest demen hym myghty of goinge that goth on his feet
til he myghte comen to thilke place fro the whiche place ther ne
laye no weie forthere to be gon, ryght so mostow nedes demen hym
for ryght myghty, that geteth and atteyneth to the ende of alle
thinges that ben to desire, byyonde the whiche ende ther nys no
thing to desire. Of the whiche power of good folk men mai
conclude that the wikkide men semen to be bareyne and naked of
alle strengthe.
"For whi forleten thei vertus and folwen vices? Nys it
nat
for that thei ne knowen nat the godes? But what thing is more
feble and more caytif than is the blyndnesse of ignorance? Or
elles thei knowen ful wel whiche thinges that thei oughten folwe,
but lecherie and covetise overthroweth hem mystorned. And certes
so doth distempraunce to feble men, that ne mowen nat wrastlen
ayen the vices. Ne knowen thei nat thanne wel that thei forleten
the good wilfully, and turnen hem wilfully to vices?
"And in this wise thei ne forleten nat oonly to ben
myghti, but thei forleten al outrely in any wise for to been. For
thei that forleten the comune fyn of alle thinges that ben, thei
forleten also therwithal for to been. And peraventure it scholde
seme to som folk that this were a merveile to seien, that
schrewes, whiche that contenen the more partie of men, ne ben nat
ne han no beynge; but natheles it is so, and thus stant this
thing. For thei that ben schrewes I denye nat that they ben
schrewes, but I denye and seie simply and pleynly that thei ne
hen nat, ne han no beynge. For right as thou myghtest seyn of the
careyne of a man, that it were a deed man, but thou ne myghtest
nat symply callen it a man; so graunte I wel forsothe that
vicyous folk hen wikkid, but I ne may nat graunten absolutly and
symply that thei ben. For thilke thing that withholdeth ordre and
kepeth nature, thilke thing es, and hath beinge; but what thing
that faileth of that (that is to seyn, he
that
forleteth naturel ordre), he forleteth thilke beinge that
is set in his nature.
"But thow wolt seyn that schrewes mowen. Certes, that ne
denye I nat; but certes hir power ne desscendeth nat of
strengthe, but of feblesse. For thei mowen don wikkydnesses, the
whiche thei ne myghten nat don yif thei myghten duellen in the
forme and in the doynge of good folk. And thilke power scheweth
ful evidently that they ne mowen ryght nat. For so as I have
gadrid and proevid a litil herebyforn that evel is nawght, and
so as schrewes mowen oonly but schrewednesses, this conclusion
is al cler, that
schrewes ne mowen ryght nat, ne han no power.
"And for as moche as thou undirstonde which is the
strengthe of this power of schrewes, I have diffinysched a litil
herbyforn that no thing is so myghti as sovereyn good."
"That is soth," quod I.
"And thilke same sovereyn good may don noon yvel?"
"Certes, no," quod I.
"Is ther any wyght thanne," quod sche, "that
weneth that men mowen don alle thinges?"
"No man," quod I, "but yif he be out of his
wyt."
"But certes schrewes mowen don evel?" quod sche.
"Ye. Wolde God," quod I, "that thei ne myghten
don
noon!"
"Thanne," quod sche, "so as he that
is myghty to doon oonly but goode thinges mai doon alle thinges,
and thei that hen myghti to doon yvele thinges ne mowen nat alle
thinges, thanne is it open thing and manyfest that thei that
mowen doon yvele ben of lasse
power.
"And yit to proeve this conclusioun ther helpeth me
this,
that I have schewed herebyforn, that alle power is to be noumbred
among thinges that men oughten requere; and I have schewed that
alle thinges that oughten ben desired ben referred to good, ryght
as to a maner heighte of hir nature. But for to mowen don yvel
and felonye ne mai nat ben referrid to good; thanne nys nat yvel
of the nombre of thinges that oughten ben desired.
But alle power aughte ben desired and requerid; thanne is it open
and cler that the power ne the mowynge of schrewes nis no power.
"And of alle thise thinges it scheweth wel that the gode
folk ben certeinli myghty, and the schrewes doutelees ben
unmyghty. And it is cler and opene that thilke sentence of Plato
is verray and soth, that seith that oonly wise men may doon that
thei desiren, and schrewes mowen haunten that hem liketh, but
that thei desiren (that is to seyn, to come to sovereyn good),
thei ne han no power to acomplissen that. For schrewes don that
hem lyst whan, by tho thinges in whiche thei deliten, thei wenen
to ateynen to thilke good that thei desiren; but thei ne geten
ne ateyne nat therto, for vices ne comen nat to blisfulnesse.
